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ONE BAD DAY: THOUGHTS ON THE 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ANIMAL RIGHTS 
AND ANIMAL WELFARE 
Neil D. Hamilton* † 
Introduction 
The lawsuit pitting the New Jersey Society for the Prevention of Cruelty 
to Animals against the New Jersey Department of Agriculture brings into 
sharp focus the issue of animal rights versus animal welfare that has been 
dividing animal activists, farmers, and society for decades. On one side are 
proponents of animal rights—a set of rights articulated by humans but 
granted to animals to govern how we treat them. For many believers this 
includes the right not to be owned and certainly not to be eaten. On the other 
side are proponents of animal welfare—also a set of human derived stan-
dards governing how we care for animals under our control. Animal welfare 
concerns are reflected in laws prohibiting cruelty and criminalizing certain 
abusive behavior. The debate as illustrated in the New Jersey litigation in-
volves conflicting perspectives on what duties (or rights) we owe animals 
and on who should decide, using what standards. The contours of the debate 
have evolved, as reflected in the emergence of “Animal Law” in American 
legal education. Modern livestock production has also changed significantly, 
with an increase in confinement production. With these changes, the funda-
mental legal issues remain divisive, emotional, and elusive of clear 
resolution. 
I. Legalizing the Debate Between Animal Rights 
and Animal Welfare 
The New Jersey case is unique, perhaps even significant, because it in-
volves a focused legal challenge rather than an intellectual debate or noisy 
rally about whether to serve meat in the cafeteria. As a legalized issue the 
case could be—and most likely will be if the lower court decision is a 
guide—decided on narrow legal grounds of statutory interpretation and ju-
dicial deference to agency rulemaking. Even a narrow legal ruling will be 
welcomed by the winning side, but it will not resolve the underlying debate 
of animal rights versus animal welfare. The court will unlikely resolve that 
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question—the divide between those who endorse traditional livestock hus-
bandry practices and those who allege many of them are inhumane and 
cruel. Perhaps it is a resolution impossible to achieve in a courtroom, rule-
making procedure, or legislative debate—at least not without significant 
changes in society’s relation to food and without extending human-based 
legal “rights” to animals raised for our purposes. 
When stripped of the gloss of litigation and public relations, the debate 
isn’t just about animal welfare; if it were, the “carefully reviewed” decision 
by the New Jersey Department of Agriculture would resolve the matter. The 
real debate, at least for those who view it from the perspective of animal 
welfare, is more complicated. For example, some of those supporting the 
New Jersey action, such as Farm Sanctuary, do not believe animals should 
be eaten or that livestock production—modern or otherwise—should exist. 
For them the debate is a proxy war pitting animal rights and vegetarianism 
against the continued production and consumption of meat by society—
masked as concern for animal welfare and the rule of law. For others, such 
as the Center for Food Safety, the question is how to balance animal welfare 
concerns and the profitability of farms, or how strongly economic arguments 
should be weighed in debates over particular practices. 
II. The Validity of Farm Production Practices
No doubt there are well-meaning opponents of New Jersey’s rules who 
believe the practices under scrutiny are in fact “inhumane.” Perhaps such 
opponents would eat the veal chop if they knew the calf was raised in a pen 
rather than a crate or would enjoy the hamburger more knowing the steer 
had been anesthetized before being castrated. More likely, however, the food 
choices of most consumers would not be altered by this knowledge. More-
over, the New Jersey debate is not just a proxy war, but a phony war, to 
boot, given the heated rhetoric of how the practices in question are em-
ployed only by factory farms. The reality is many of the practices, such as 
castrating young males, are used by small family farmers as well as “factory 
farms.” 
Many production practices, such as dehorning, castration, and debeak-
ing, are done for valid production and management reasons and are familiar 
to every child who grew up with livestock. Of course, notions of what 
makes a practice “valid” or justified depend on where in the food chain you 
are located—as is your view of what is inhumane. From a farmer’s perspec-
tive, or for the veterinarian community, the practices in question are not 
considered abusive and are not done to be cruel. But for non-farmers or con-
sumers, practices like these sound painful and are easily portrayed as 
inhumane. Can you imagine doing them to a pet? Animal abuse and cruelty 
have well-developed bodies of state law prohibiting mistreatment of farm 
animals. But the case is not only about law but also about rights. Here the 
debate becomes more complicated because it cannot be denied that some 
farm practices cause temporary or transient pain to animals. As a young boy 
the squeals of pigs having rings clamped in their noses made me want to 
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hide. But were their squeals about being grabbed by a human or the ringing? 
The fear and squeal would be no different if the pig was being grabbed to 
administer anesthetic or pinch the ring. But the reality of why Dad ringed 
their noses was undeniable—to stop them from rooting under the fence into 
the growing corn, or worse yet for their safety, running on the nearby road. 
Ringing pigs is not common on farms today but not because any court 
ruled it inhumane. Instead, most pigs are confined in buildings, no longer 
free to root the soil. One promising development in our food system and in 
livestock production—at least for eaters concerned about food quality and 
the care farm animals receive—is the growing movement to local food and 
sustainable farming. Organizing producers to market food labeled to inform 
eaters how it is raised is critical to providing consumers with the quality of 
food they desire. For years I have worked with Iowa farmers who supply 
pork for Niman Ranch. The meat is labeled as sustainably and humanely 
raised on farms certified to meet the Animal Welfare Institute standards of 
care. The pigs are raised outdoors and not fed animal byproducts or antibiot-
ics. These farmers are committed to providing their pigs the best care 
possible. Paul Willis, founder of Niman Ranch Pork Company and promi-
nent sustainable Iowa hog farmer, says “our pigs only have one bad day” 
rather than a lifetime of confinement. But Paul’s pigs still end their lives as 
pork serving the needs of mankind. And the baby males are castrated with-
out anesthesia, not because Paul is cruel, but because alternatives would add 
unnecessary cost and stress to their production.  
III. Litigation Cannot Resolve the Debate
Are Paul and his colleagues demon “factory farms,” or are they caring 
producers who should be supported and trusted by consumers? Litigation 
like the present case in New Jersey diverts citizens and animal activists (at 
least those really interested in improving conditions for livestock) from sup-
porting farmers committed to taking the best care of their animals. If people 
oppose factory farms—and there are many legitimate concerns about social 
ills of industrialized production—there are more direct ways to confront 
them rather than arguing in court that their practices are inhumane. Pursuing 
environmental compliance, raising public awareness of health risks from air 
pollution, and assuring worker safety are all more direct avenues—as are 
market-based actions of not buying their products. Recent actions by major 
food retailers, such as McDonald’s decision to require egg suppliers to in-
crease the spacing given hens and dairies refusing to purchase milk 
produced with rBST (recombinant bovine somatotropin) or artificial growth 
hormones, show how sensitive the market can be to consumer concerns. 
Animal welfare issues are part of the marketer-consumer context. 
My arguments may be suspect for opponents of New Jersey’s livestock 
rules. As a farm boy, meat eater, former cattle owner, and agricultural law 
professor—whatever that is—am I tainted by complicity in a lifestyle of 
cruelty and animal neglect? Maybe so, but doubters should also know I 
founded the local Slow Food convivium in Des Moines to help eaters ex-
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perience the joys of food, sell produce to restaurants from our market gar-
den, own many pets, freely criticize industrial agriculture, and advise small 
livestock producers seeking markets to support their practices. Rather than 
reduce the debate to narrow legal definitions like “inhumane” that are 
freighted with our own ideas of morality and ethics, it might be more effec-
tive to put the debate about livestock care into a larger context of social 
relations. 
Consider two examples that question whether our perceptions of cruel 
and inhumane are more imagined than real. First is circumcising baby 
boys—done for health or religious reasons—something I experienced 54 
years ago. I do not remember the event, but no doubt I cried, bled, and felt 
some pain. I cannot say I would like to do it again today, but does that make 
my parent’s decision cruel or inhumane? Should we outlaw the practice or 
require it be done under anesthesia—and if so local or general? Which 
treatment would threaten a baby’s health more? Who should decide? The 
second illustration is for law students. Remember the first day of class with 
a professor that used the Socratic method? Some may have thrived, but if 
you were like me you were terrified—at least at first. But you got used to it, 
you survived, and if the reasoning behind Socratic method can be trusted, it 
made you a better student and lawyer. Was it inhumane or cruel? Is it a le-
gitimate teaching method—herd health management so to speak—or should 
it be outlawed or challenged as illegal under Michigan’s anti-hazing law? 
Whose standards should prevail—professors’ or student-rights activists’?  
Conclusion 
When I started attending the Association of American Law Schools 
(AALS) meetings we created an Agricultural Law section. In the mid 1980’s 
when the farm financial crisis threatened the lives and livelihoods of thou-
sands of farm families, the section was lucky to attract ten colleagues to 
discuss helping farmers save their farms. At the same time the Animal Law 
section emerged and the size of their sessions grew. Agricultural law still 
struggles to attract twenty colleagues to sessions. At the 2008 New York 
meeting, our themes were the environment and alternative energy and in 
2007, farmer-worker issues. Animal law has had far healthier growth and 
today is taught at many schools. In academia the rights of animals are ap-
parently more attractive than those of farmers, eaters, or workers. The New 
York session “Debating Animals as Legal Persons” was packed. But a 
statement in the program description puzzled me—“No quintessentially 
‘human’ characteristic definitively sets humans apart from other animals.” 
This seed sprouts the New Jersey litigation and our debate. 
Think about it for a moment. Do you agree: have you ever been con-
fused you were something other than a human or have you mistaken an 
animal as a human (regardless of how your dog might answer)? Of course 
not—there is a human essence that defines us all. But is the statement true, 
legally, or can we make it true? This incident is paralleled by another New 
Jersey story—the tragic tale of the landscaper, a human you might note, se-
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verely mauled by an employer’s dog. Under New Jersey law he recovered 
damages for the injuries but the dog was impounded and sentenced to die as 
a vicious animal. What has since unfolded illustrates our mixed, perhaps 
even misguided, attitudes about animal rights. The November 20, 2007, New 
York Times headline says it all, “A Landscaper is Mauled, and an Outpouring 
of Sympathy Goes to the Dog.” Yes, we are animals too and in a legal de-
mocracy we can choose who we like more. But do we need to deny our 
humanity to promote animal rights? Perhaps those who rally for the dog are 
just saying landscapers and humans deserve our one bad day too. Animal 
welfare or animal rights—good luck bridging the divide. 
